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Available online at www.sciencedirect.comIn 1980, the World Health Assembly announced that smallpox
had been successfully eradicated as a disease of humans. The
disease clinically and immunologically most similar to smallpox
is monkeypox, a zoonosis endemic to moist forested regions in
West and Central Africa. Smallpox vaccine provided protection
against both infections. Monkeypox virus is a less efficient
human pathogen than the agent of smallpox, but absent
smallpox and the population-wide immunity engendered
during eradication efforts, could monkeypox now gain a
foothold in human communities? We discuss possible ecologic
and epidemiologic limitations that could impede monkeypox’s
emergence as a significant pathogen of humans, and evaluate
whether genetic constrains are sufficient to diminish
monkeypox virus’ capacity for enhanced specificity as a
parasite of humans.
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Background
The history of vaccination begins with the use of an
animal virus to immunize humans against smallpox [1].
It ends with this same practice. By the close of 1979, the
concerted application of vaccinia virus-based vaccine in
at-risk populations had effectively interrupted the spread
of smallpox, resulting in the eradication of naturally
occurring disease throughout the world. This was possible
because of antigenic similarities between vaccinia and
variola (the agent of smallpox) viruses, and the fact that
Variola is human-specific, leaving no potential for zoono-
tic reservoirs.
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the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the funding
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www.sciencedirect.com Vaccinia and variola are Orthopoxviruses. Orthopoxviruses
encompass an array of pathogens that elicit serologic
cross-reactivity, among which only one, variola, is an
exclusive parasite of humans. Several zoonotic Orthopox-
viruses — including vaccinia virus, cowpox virus, and
monkeypox virus — can infect humans opportunistically
(in the event of an encounter between a virus-infected
animal and a susceptible individual), but none manifest
variola’s capacity for relatively efficient inter-human
spread, with the possible exception of monkeypox.
Initial observations of a ‘smallpox-like’ illness caused by
infection with monkeypox virus rather than variola were
made in 1970, during the final stages of smallpox eradica-
tion [2]. The discovery occurred during time of intensi-
fied effort to verify that smallpox had been eliminated
from regions of West and Central Africa that had been
deemed ‘smallpox-free’. The two diseases, smallpox and
monkeypox, share a distinctive clinical presentation and
almost certainly existed historically in sympatry across
what is recognized now as the endemic range for mon-
keypox (Figure 1). But, in the absence of laboratory
testing to specify the etiologic agent responsible for
the condition, it is likely that most Orthopoxvirus-associ-
ated ‘smallpox-like’ illnesses were assumed to be small-
pox; smallpox being broadly distributed and extremely
well known.
It is now more than 30 years since the WHO recom-
mended cessation of routine smallpox vaccination. Very
few individuals born since eradication have received
smallpox vaccination, and among those over 30 years of
age who did receive vaccination, immunity is waning.
This increasing deficit of human immunity raises the
specter of whether, under these conditions, monkeypox
might emerge as a more significant human pathogen,
perhaps even ‘replacing’ smallpox. Indeed recent reports
of increasing monkeypox incidence in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) [3], as well as sporadic
occurrences in neighboring countries imply that this may
be a possibility [4–6]. But before concluding that small-
pox eradication and the cessation of vaccination have
opened an ecologic, or immunologic, niche for monkey-
pox to exploit, it seems reasonable to address the follow-
ing questions. First, during the era before smallpox
eradication, was the level of immunity in human popu-
lations — engendered either by smallpox vaccination or
by the circulation of smallpox — responsible in some way
for suppressing the emergence and spread of monkeypox?
Or, are there in fact particular characteristics intrinsic toCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343
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Figure 1
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Map depicting the distribution of the smallpox in Africa 1954–1958, by
country, before the inception of global eradication efforts (‘Smallpox
1958’, light green), and during the latter stages of eradication, at the time
human monkeypox was discovered (‘Smallpox 1971’, dark green) [12].
Countries reporting at least one case of human monkeypox through
1990 are depicted with cross-hatching.
Image courtesy of Benjamin Monroe, CDC.monkeypox (ecologic requirements, genetic determi-
nants, among others) that have served to establish funda-
mental limits on the virus’ capacity to emerge and spread
beyond its current geographic confines? And if so, are
there mechanisms or opportunities that could allow mon-
keypox to overcome these limitations?
Immunologic niche
Smallpox (variola major) is associated with higher fatality
rates than monkeypox, but the clinical presentation of
monkeypox is difficult to distinguish from discrete, ordin-
ary smallpox (Figure 2), and smallpox vaccine is protec-
tive against both. A debate continues as to the duration of
immunity provided by smallpox vaccine in the absence of
periodic boosting [7–9], but it is inarguable that lifelong
protection from re-infection was a lasting indemnity for
having survived smallpox [10]. Presumably, a smallpox
survivor would also possess life-long protection against
infection with monkeypox virus (and vice versa), thus an
individual infected with one virus would be permanently
removed from the pool of susceptible hosts for the other.Current Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343 In contrast, smallpox vaccination provides only limited-
term protection from infection with either monkeypox or
variola. Could smallpox circulation in monkeypox ende-
mic regions of Africa then have been sufficient to impede
the spread of human monkeypox? What level of vaccina-
tion would have been required to achieve the same
effect?
During a 40-year period from 1919 to 1958 an estimated
122 600 cases of smallpox were reported by the Colonial
authorities in DRC (Belgian Congo), on average 3065
cases per year [11]. During that same period, roughly 78
million vaccinations and re-vaccinations were adminis-
tered, the vast majority after 1945. In the 7 years immedi-
ately before the inception of the concerted vaccination
programs, 14 000 total cases of smallpox were reported
(from a population of 7.7 million persons [11]). In time,
vaccination had a clear impact on smallpox and ultimately
led to eradication, and collaterally on potential human
monkeypox infections. However, in the absence of data
describing the incidence of monkeypox human infections
before and during much of the eradication era, it is
difficult to determine the role of smallpox population
(herd) immunity for vaccine induced immunity in the
incidence of monkeypox human disease. Despite the
absence of quality control of vaccines before the 1960s,
the combination of smallpox and vaccine-derived immu-
nity would provide protection against monkeypox infec-
tion. Since vaccination rates exceeded smallpox case rates
in central Africa during this period, it is easy to imagine a
converse relationship between smallpox vaccination and
human monkeypox incidence during this period and
immediately following eradication of smallpox.
Between 1967 and 1971, at the height of the smallpox
eradication efforts, an estimated 15 236 000 doses of
vaccine were provided to 21 countries in West and Cen-
tral Africa for purposes of vaccination or re-vaccination
against smallpox [12]. The sheer numbers of immuniz-
ations doubtless had an impact on the incidence, and
possibly the geographic distribution of not just smallpox,
but of other Orthopoxvirus-associated human infections
including monkeypox. No human monkeypox cases have
been reported from West Africa since 1981 [13], though
evidence points to the fact that monkeypox virus still
circulates enzootically [14,15]. And in the years immedi-
ately following smallpox eradication (1985–95), reports of
monkeypox from the Congo Basin declined measurably
[16].
It is difficult to assess what the ecologic impact of variola
might have been on monkeypox virus over earlier time-
periods, when the viruses were circulating independent of
the influence of vaccine. As a solely human pathogen,
variola’s ability to persist in populations is vulnerable to
immunologically driven interruptions in human-to-
human transmission chains. By contrast, monkeypox iswww.sciencedirect.com
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Figure 2
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(a) Legs and feet of monkeypox patient (photo courtesy of J. Harvey). (b) Legs and feet of smallpox patient at similar stage of rash (pustular) (photo
courtesy of J. Nobel, CDC).
Q1a sylvatic zoonosis and human infections are incidental
and probably of little consequence to the overall persist-
ence of the virus in nature. The current endemic distri-
bution of monkeypox is in all likelihood governed by the
distribution of its principal host(s). However, incidence of
human infection is also dependent on cross protective
immunity stemming from the vaccination campaign and
previous exposure to variola or other Orthopoxviruses.
Monkeypox virus is, however, capable of infecting a
broad range of hosts, and spillover into a new permissive
host with a more cosmopolitan distribution could — in
theory — contribute to the virus’ emerging as a threat to
humans.
Ecologic context of monkeypox
Broad host range zoonotic agents have been highlighted as
being more likely to be emerging or re-emerging human
pathogens. Over 50% of zoonotic viruses with 3 or more
types of non-human hosts have been classified as emerging
agents [17]. Monkeypox virus can infect an array of mam-
malian taxa including Sciurid, Glirid and Nesomyid
rodents (Cynomys sp., Funisciurus sp., Graphiurus sp., Cri-
cetomys sp.), marsupials (Monodelphis domestica, Delphius
marsupialis), and primates (Callithrix jacchus, Homo sapiens)
[18,19]. In each of the examples provided, infections
occurred without experimental induction by humans,
but for most, human intervention was responsible for
bringing the species in question into proximity with the
virus. Monkeypox virus has only been isolated once from
an animal captured in its natural environment — in 1986www.sciencedirect.com monkeypox virus was isolated from the carcass of a Funis-
cirus squirrel found in Equateur Province of DRC [20]. The
host range of naturally occurring (sylvatic) monkeypox
remains undefined, but given its capacity to infect many
different types of animals, it is likely to exceed the 3-host
threshold.
Large mammals, gazelles and primates, have been singled
out as potentially important sources of human infection in
Central Africa [21], but the consistency of associations
between rodent hosts and viruses across the Orthopoxvirus
clade suggest that a rodent reservoir (or reservoirs) would
be more likely for monkeypox [1,22] (Table 1). The
perpetuation of acute viral infections in small populations
is often theorized to necessitate either virus persistence or
latency in the host (which is not characteristic of Ortho-
poxvirus infections) or high host turnover [23], which again
points toward a rodent reservoir. Rodent fauna, such as
squirrels (Funiscirus sp., Heliosciurus sp.) and Cricetomys,
that are known to be susceptible to monkeypox virus
infection, and that exploit food sources and refuges in
areas adjacent to forest margins and human communities
in DRC, are perhaps the most likely reservoirs and agents
of virus transmission to humans [24,25]. Virus spillover into
a more widely distributed sister taxa could raise concerns
about the spread of disease beyond Africa.
In artificial settings, the common European squirrel Scir-
urus vulgaris has proven to be sensitive to infection with
monkeypox virus [26] and the North American SciuridCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343
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Table 1
Examples of (non-primate) mammalian species that are susceptible to infection with monkeypox virus, and their suitability as vectors of
infection to humans.
Order Family Species Circumstance of infection Potential as significant
monkeypox vector to humansa
Rodentia Sciuridae Sciurus vulgaris Experimental infectionb Not a significant vector of directly
transmitted zoonotic pathogens
Funisciurus spp. Natural infection (sylvatic);
experimental infectionb
Range restricted
Heliosciurus spp. Captive animal;
experimental infectionb
Range restricted
Marmota monax Captive animal Not a significant vector of directly
transmitted zoonotic pathogens;
range restricted
Cynomys ludovicianus Captive animal;
experimental infectionb
Not a significant vector of directly
transmitted zoonotic pathogens;
range restricted
Gliridae Graphiurus spp. Captive animal;
experimental infectionb
Range restricted
Nesomyidae Cricetomys spp. Captive animal Range restrictedd
Dipodidae Jaculus sp. Captive animal Range restricted
Muridae Rattus norvegicus Experimental infectionb
(1–3-day-old animals)c
Only very young animals
are susceptible to infection
Mus musculus Experimental infectionb
(8–15-day-old animals)c
Only very young animals
are susceptible to infection
Langomorpha Leporidae Oryctolagus cuniculus Experimental infectionb
(10-day-old animals)c
Only very young animals
are susceptible to infection
Didelphimorphia Didelphidae Monodelphis domestica Captive animal Range restricted
Didelphis marsupialis Captive animal Range restricted
Erinaceomorpha Erinaceidae Atlerix spp. Captive animal Range restricted
a Refers to the species’ potential to serve as significant monkeypox vector to humans outside of the current areas of endemic monkeypox disease in
Africa.
b Routes of experimental infection include abrasion, foot pad inoculation, intranasal introduction of virus [26,27,53,54].
c In these experiments, adult animals refractory to infection [27].
d A colony of introduced Cricetomys sp. has been described in the State of Florida, USA [55].rodent Cynomys ludovicianus has proven to be not only
susceptible to infection but also capable of transmitting
infection to humans [14,19]. The more common commen-
sal rodents, Rattus spp. and Mus spp. are not considered to
be especially susceptible to monkeypox virus infection,
although monkeypox virus can be propagated in several
inbred strains of mice and in immature animals [27,28].
In the absence of virus spillover and perpetuation in a
readily susceptible, broadly distributed animal host, the
spread of monkeypox beyond its areas of current ende-
micity in Africa would be dependent on human-to-human
transmission which prompts the question of whether the
inter-human transmission of monkeypox is sufficiently
robust for this to occur?
Inter-human transmission potential
Whether monkeypox virus can exploit humans as a viable
maintenance host will inevitably depend on the virus’
capacity for sustained inter-human transmission. Epide-
miologic modeling studies performed in the 1980s led to
the conclusion that it would be highly improbable for
monkeypox to become established in human populationsCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343 owing to the virus’ intrinsic lack of transmissibility [29,30].
The stochastic models used in these studies incorporated
numerical estimates for contact and transmission rate vari-
ables that were derived from directly observed data [31].
Observations collected from 1980 to 1984 in DRC showed
that people living in communities at risk for monkeypox
had on average 10.7 close contacts (with 50% being high-
risk household contacts), that secondary attack rates were
approximately 6.7 times higher for unvaccinated contacts
than vaccinated contacts, and that approximately 70% of
the population had been vaccinated. Assuming these con-
ditions, only 2% of model simulations resulted in a 3rd-
generation virus transmission event, and no iterations
resulted perpetuation beyond the 6th generation of spread.
And even assuming ‘worst case scenario’ conditions —
whereby vaccine-derived immunity in the starting popu-
lation was 0% — the resultant number of cases per simu-
lation increased by approximately a factor of 4, but still no
simulations resulted in indefinite, sustained virus trans-
mission [30]; the R0 never achieved 1.
The basic reproductive rate of an infection, R0, describes
the inherent transmissibility of an infection within awww.sciencedirect.com
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however the value is subject to influence by population
demographics, contact patterns, and heterogeneities of
susceptibility among individuals. Employing a straight-
forward calculation of the number of new cases generated
by a single monkeypox infection [29], the R0 of the
modeled scenario above could pass the threshold of 1
by simply augmenting of the total number of close con-
tacts from 10.7 to 13.7. Alternatively, increasing the
proportion of contacts that are high-risk household con-
tacts from 50% to 80% achieves the same outcome. Thus,
within this framework (which assumes an absence of
vaccine-derived immunity), fairly minor shifts in the
epidemiologic context of monkeypox could tip the bal-
ance in favor of sustained spread even in the absence of
other ecologic or evolutionary modifications.
Obtaining modern estimates of secondary contact rates
and knowledge of human contact patterns in monkeypox
endemic areas will be important for assessing the epide-
miologic potential of monkeypox for sustained inter-
human transmission in contemporary at-risk commu-
nities. Regardless, however, of the current reproductive
rate of monkeypox in human populations, probabilistic
arguments suggest that a zoonotic pathogen with an R0
near to one (such as monkeypox) retains a greater poten-
tial to evolve to a state of higher transmissibility as
transmission chains lengthen and as the number of
primary introductions increases [33]. Under this scenario,
evolutionary advancements could accrue in stepwise
fashion through individual character state changes, pro-
vided each step were to confer an incremental advantage
in transmissibility (fitness) [33]. For example, an initial
(hypothetical) virus mutation that enhances seeding and
proliferation of virus in the epithelium of the human
throat, followed by a second mutation that potentiates
irritation and coughing, could provide a theoretical fitness
advantage at each step; whereas reversing the steps would
likely not.
Zoonotic pathogens of intermediate transmissibility to
humans such as monkeypox may be well positioned to
derive selective advantage (for heightened transmissibil-
ity) from minor gains in host specialization. But, would
increasing the inter-human transmission potential of
monkeypox necessarily require increased specialization
for humans and, if so, would that in turn necessarily lead
toward recapitulation of a pathogen with the virulence
and characteristics of variola?
Evolutionary constraints
Though monkeypox and (discrete ordinary) smallpox
would be difficult to distinguish from one another in a
clinical setting, there are subtle clues that point toward
one illness as opposed to the other. Lymphadenopathy,
for example, is a prominent feature of monkeypox [34,35]
yet was nearly absent in smallpox patients. Nodalwww.sciencedirect.com swelling has been described with smallpox [36,37], but
the underlying process for this — localized edema — is
distinct from the process of lymphoid hyperplasia
(lymphocyte proliferation) observed in non-human
primates infected with monkeypox virus [38,39]. Other
functional differences affecting immune evasion and
manipulation of the host immune system are predicted
based on genome-level comparisons between variola and
monkeypox viruses.
A core set of 90 conserved genes has been proposed as the
‘minimum essential genome’ of all Chrodopoxviruses
(the subfamily that encompasses those poxviruses that
parasitize vertebrate animals) [40]. This set accounts for
only 50% of the haploid gene content of variola virus
[41]. A typical Orthopoxvirus such as variola or monkey-
pox will have, in addition, genes associated with host
specificity, immunomodulation and subcellular traffick-
ing (for example), as well as a complement of open
reading frames (orfs) with unknown function, regions
of non-coding sequence, and long inverted terminal
repeats (ITRs). Fluctuations in gene content — gene
gain, gene loss — can provide opportunities for Ortho-
poxvirus adaptation to alternative hosts [42]. In fact,
broad-scale evaluation of Orthopoxviruses genomes
suggests that it is not uncommon for genes that have
been acquired or lost to be those associated with host-
specific properties [40,42].
In general, monkeypox virus genomes have, or have
retained, considerably more DNA content than variola.
A comparison of the Zaire-96 strain of monkeypox
[41,43] and the Kuwait-1967 strain of variola captures
trends present across a broader sampling of each species:
here, the monkeypox genome includes 4 additional genes
and is 11 000 nucleotides longer than the variola gen-
ome; it has 10.5 longer ITRs, and extra coding
sequences within the ITRs (whereas variola has none)
[41]. Variola unquestionably has one of the most signifi-
cantly size-restricted genomes of all the Orthopoxviruses,
yet it is not a trimmed-down version of monkeypox.
Variola has (depending on the analysis) up to 9 defined
coding sequences that monkeypox viruses do not have, or
of which monkeypox viruses have only retained frag-
ments [44]. In contrast, monkeypox has 16 defined
orfs not present in variola [44,45] (Table 2).
Several of the loci found in variola that are missing or
truncated in monkeypox are hypothesized to play a role in
immune evasion and virulence. For example, the variola
genome harbors a virulence-associated gene (C3L) that
expresses an inhibitor of complement enzymes. The
ortholog of this gene (D14L) is either missing or
expressed as a truncated (but functional) protein in mon-
keypox viruses [45,46]. The question of how pivotal the
protein is to establishing robust Orthopoxvirus infections
in humans is still the subject of investigation, but theCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343
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Table 2
Loci with known function in variola that are missing or truncated in monkeypox.a,b
Locus Function Variola Monkeypox (Central African)
C3L Inhibitor of complement
enzymes
Co-factor in cleavage of C3b and C4b; C3
and C5 decay-accelerating activity
Truncated version of protein;
C3b and C4b cleavage activity
(lower efficiency that variola protein);
no decay-accelerating activity
C10L IL-b antagonist protein C-terminal domain of protein binds host IL-b
receptor blocking IL-b-mediated cellular
activation pathways
Truncated version of protein lacking
C-terminal domain
K3L elF-2a protein Mimic of host cell translation initiation factor,
mimic protein binds to the host’s INF-induced
inhibitor of translation, thereby allowing
translation to continue in infected cells
Gene absent or fragmented
E3L INF-resistance protein N-terminal domain of protein binds Z-DNA and
may influence the expression of immune
response genes; C-terminal domain of protein
binds dsRNA and inhibits Type I
interferon-mediated host cell activation
Truncated version of protein
with only the C-terminal,
dsRNA-binding domain
A49R Phosphotransferase No predicted role in virulence Gene absent
a This is not intended to constitute an exhaustive list. Adapted from [44].
b On the basis of genome comparisons between the Bangladesh-75 strain of variola and a strain of monkeypox isolated from a Congolese patient in
1996 (ZAI-96) [45,56].smallpox protein is presumed to modulate a critical
feature of the host innate immune system early during
infection [45,46,47,48]. (Experimental attempts to
demonstrate the functional importance of this locus to
other orthopoxirus virulence phenotypes — either by
adding the locus to deficient genetic backgrounds or by
ablating the function from virulent background — have
generated inconsistent results [49,50].)
If the gene complement of monkeypox is lacking certain
essential coding sequences related to host specialization,
monkeypox virus’ larger genome size and unique orfs
could theoretically provide enough genetic plasticity to
overcome the limitation. For instance, deficiencies in
certain variola-specific functions could be met through
alternative pathways — that is, functional pathways for
immune evasion or inhibition that differ from variola’s,
yet ultimately impact the same target within the host.
A scan of the genome indicates that monkeypox viruses
are deficient with respect to full-length orthologs for the
two prominent loci in variola that influence interferon-
resistance (E3L, K3L) [44,45]. Yet, host-expression
microarrays generated following infection of primary
human monocytes with monkeypox virus unambiguously
demonstrated diminution of interferon-associated host
gene expression [51]. Thus, although monkeypox virus
lacks full-length orthologs for these variola genes associ-
ated with interferon resistance, suppression of host inter-
feron-induced gene expression is still achieved. This
particular phenomenon, though not fully characterized,
provides one example of a virus phenotype, common to
both variola and monkeypox, that is manifest throughCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343 non-equivalent processes. The inhibition of host inter-
leukin-1 beta (IL1-b) may be another.
Variola expresses a full-length IL1-b antagonist protein
(C10L ortholog) that binds at its C-terminal end to host
IL-1b receptors effectively preventing or diminishing
host cell activation by the cytokine [52]. Only the N-
terminal portion of the protein is expressed by monkey-
pox virus [45] suggesting that the monkeypox protein
would not demonstrate IL1-b receptor binding capacity.
However, some Central African strains of monkeypox
appear to possess the capacity to interfere with host cell
activation by IL1-b. These variants of monkeypox virus
putatively express a protein (B15R) that binds directly to
IL-1b, rather than to its host cell receptor [44,46,52]. If
borne out by functional studies, this could constitute and
alternative means — not found in variola — of achieving
the same host immune-modulatory effect.
Conceivably, further adaptation of monkeypox virus to
humans, if it happens at all, could arrive through gene
gain, or through nucleotide changes and optimization of
these non-equivalent, redundant pathways (convergent
evolution).
Conclusion
If the question initially posed was ‘What is the intrinsic
potential of monkeypox to fill the void left by the eradi-
cation of smallpox?’, we conclude here with a mixed
assessment. The scope of human immunity generated
by eradication-era vaccinations unquestionably had an
impact on the prevalence and distribution of both mon-
keypox and smallpox. But only smallpox was eradicablewww.sciencedirect.com
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logic picture appears favorable for the resurgence of
monkeypox in disease endemic areas — owing to increas-
ing population-level vulnerability — but several factors
inherent to the genetic makeup and ecology of monkey-
pox virus would seem to diminish the probability that this
disease will spread to a significant degree outside the
moist tropical forests of West and Central Africa.
The 2003 outbreak of monkeypox in the United States,
which began with importation of infected animals from
West Africa, provided a stark example of how spillover
and propagation in a permissive animal could, at least
temporarily, expand the range of monkeypox. Yet the
most plausible animal taxa for monkeypox virus propa-
gation and spread (Sciurid rodents, for example) are
likely to be inefficient transmitters of infection to
humans. Conversely, taxa more frequently implicated
in transmission of zoonotic diseases to humans (Mus and
Rattus) are not particularly susceptible to infection with
monkeypox virus. It is arguable that for emergence to
occur, gains in transmission efficiency and in the capa-
bility of monkeypox virus to exploit humans as hosts
would be required. The path to achieving these gains
(and an R0 >1 in human populations) could involve
relatively minor changes to the epidemiology of the
disease (e.g. increasing the number of high-risk contacts
by 20%) or evolutionary modifications that enhance
infection success and specificity in humans hosts. But, in
the immediate future, neither path is likely to lead to the
recapitulation of a pathogen with the same virulence
properties as smallpox.
In the meantime, monkeypox will continue to be a
significant public health concern for people living in
endemic areas. Waning immunity, inadequate housing
and health infrastructure, and the lack of alternatives to
bush meat consumption all likely contribute to increasing
the concern that monkeypox may re-emerge in Central
Africa. This in turn contributes to fears about export of
the virus to neighboring countries. Appropriate and effec-
tive interventions are urgently needed to prevent ongoing
human infections. By focusing on disease prevention
efforts in areas already affected by monkeypox, we
may ultimately diminish the probability that monkeypox
will be a future threat in other environments.
Acknowledgement
The authors would like to thank Benjamin Monroe for helping to produce
figures for this article.
References and recommended reading
Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review,
have been highlighted as:
 of special interest
1. Carroll DS, Emerson GL, Li Y, Sammons S, Olson V, Frace M,
Nakazawa Y, Czerny CP, Tryland M, Kolodziejek J et al.: Chasingwww.sciencedirect.com Jenner’s vaccine: revisiting cowpox virus classification. PLoS
One 2011, 6:e23086.
2. Ladnyj ID, Ziegler P, Kima E: A human infection caused by
monkeypox virus in Basankusu Territory, Democratic
Republic of the Congo. Bull World Health Org 1972, 46:593-597.
3.

Rimoin AW, Mulembakani PM, Johnston SC, Lloyd Smith JO,
Kisalu NK, Kinkela TL, Blumberg S, Thomassen HA, Pike BL,
Fair JN et al.: Major increase in human monkeypox incidence 30
years after smallpox vaccination campaigns cease in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2010,
107:16262-16267.
This article provides an empirical description of a 20-fold increase in the
incidence of human monkeypox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
since the eradication of smallpox and cessation of programs for routine
smallpox vaccination.
4. Berthet N, Nakoune E, Whist E, Selekon B, Burguiere AM,
Manuguerra JC, Gessain A, Kazanji M: Maculopapular lesions in
the Central African Republic. Lancet 2011, 378:1354.
5. Damon IK, Roth CE, Chowdhary V: Discovery of monkeypox in
Sudan. N Engl J Med 2006, 355:962-963.
6. Learned LA, Reynolds MG, Wassa DW, Li Y, Olson VA, Karem K,
Stempora LL, Braden ZH, Kline R, Likos A et al.: Extended
interhuman transmission of monkeypox in a hospital
community in the Republic of the Congo, 2003. Am J Trop Med
Hyg 2005, 73:428-434.
7. Hammarlund E, Lewis MW, Hansen SG, Strelow LI, Nelson JA,
Sexton GJ, Hanifin JM, Slifka MK: Duration of antiviral immunity
after smallpox vaccination. Nat Med 2003, 9:1131-1137.
8. Hammarlund E, Lewis MW, Carter SV, Amanna I, Hansen SG,
Strelow LI, Wong SW, Yoshihara P, Hanifin JM, Slifka MK: Multiple
diagnostic techniques identify previously vaccinated
individuals with protective immunity against monkeypox. Nat
Med 2005, 11:1005-1011.
9. Karem KL, Reynolds M, Hughes C, Braden Z, Nigam P, Crotty S,
Glidewell J, Ahmed R, Amara R, Damon IK: Monkeypox-induced
immunity and failure of childhood smallpox vaccination to
provide complete protection. Clin Vacc Immunol 2007,
14:1318-1327.
10. Karem KL, Reynolds MG: Protection from smallpox: beyond
immune biomarkers. Future Virol 2011, 6:709-719.
11. Schneider WH: Smallpox in Africa during colonial rule. Med Hist
2009, 53:193-227.
12. Fenner F, Henderson DA, Arita I, Jezek Z, Ladnyi ID: Smallpox and
its Eradication. Geneva: World Health Organization; 1988.
13. Breman JG, Nakano JH, Coffi E, Godfrey H, Gautun JC: Human
poxvirus disease after smallpox eradication. Am J Trop Med
Hyg 1977, 26:273-281.
14. Reed KD, Melski JW, Graham MB, Regnery RL, Sotir MJ,
Wegner MV, Kazmierczak JJ, Stratman EJ, Li Y, Fairley JA et al.:
The detection of monkeypox in humans in the Western
Hemisphere. N Engl J Med 2004, 350:342-350.
15. Reynolds MG, Carroll DS, Olson VA, Hughes C, Galley J, Likos A,
Montgomery JM, Suu-Ire R, Kwasi MO, Jeffrey RJ et al.: A silent
enzootic of an orthopoxvirus in Ghana, West Africa: evidence
for multi-species involvement in the absence of widespread
human disease. Am J Trop Med Hyg 2010, 82:746-754.
16. Technical Advisory Group on Human Monkeypox: Report of a
WHO Meeting. WHO/CDS/CSR/APH/99.5. Geneva: World Health
Organization; 1999:. pp. 1–11.
17. Woolhouse ME, Gowtage-Sequeria S: Host range and emerging
and reemerging pathogens. Emerg Infect Dis 2005, 11:1842-1847.
18. Gough AW, Barsoum NJ, Gracon SI, Mitchell L, Sturgess JM:
Poxvirus infection in a colony of common marmosets
(Callithrix jacchus). Lab Anim Sci 1982, 32:87-90.
19.

Hutson CL, Lee KN, Abel J, Carroll DS, Montgomery JM, Olson VA,
Li Y, Davidson W, Hughes C, Dillon M et al.: Monkeypox zoonotic
associations: insights from laboratory evaluation of animals
associated with the multi-state US outbreak. Am J Trop Med
Hyg 2007, 76:757-768.Current Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343
342 VaccinesThis article illustrates the broad range of animal taxa that can become
infected with monkeypox virus in the absence of specific experimental
induction of infection by humans. Rather these infections were the
consequence of the animals having been in proximity to other infected
animals or to their having had contact with virus-contaminated environ-
ments (cages, bedding).
20. Khodakevich L, Jezek Z, Kinzanzka K: Isolation of monkeypox
virus from wild squirrel infected in nature. Lancet 1986, 1:98-99.
21. Arita I: The current status of monkeypox: memorandum from a
WHO meeting. Bull World Health Org 1984, 62:703-713.
22. Emerson GL, Li Y, Frace MA, Olsen-Rasmussen MA,
Khristova ML, Govil D, Sammons SA, Regnery RL, Karem KL,
Damon IK, Carroll DS: The phylogenetics and ecology of the
orthopoxviruses endemic to North America. PLoS One 2009,
4:e7666.
23. Nathanson N: Virus perpetuation in populations: biological
variables that determine persistence or eradication. Arch Virol
Suppl 2005:3-15.
24. Khodakevich L, Szczeniowski M, Nambu MD, Jezek Z,
Marennikova S, Nakano J, Meier F: Monkeypox virus in relation
to the ecological features surrounding human settlements in
Bumba zone, Zaire. Trop Geogr Med 1987, 39:56-63.
25. Khodakevich L, Jezek Z, Messinger D: Monkeypox virus:
ecology and public health significance. Bull World Health Org
1988, 66:747-752.
26. Marennikova SS, Shelukhina EM, Zhukova OA: Experimental
infection of squirrels Sciurus vulgaris by monkey pox virus.
Acta Virol 1989, 33:399.
27. Marennikova SS, Seluhina EM: Susceptibility of some rodent
species to monkeypox virus, and course of the infection. Bull
World Health Org 1976, 53:13-20.
28. Americo JL, Moss B, Earl PL: Identification of wild-derived
inbred mouse strains highly susceptible to monkeypox virus
infection for use as small animal models. J Virol 2010,
84:8172-8180.
29.

Fine PE, Jezek Z, Grab B, Dixon H: The transmission potential of
monkeypox virus in human populations. Int J Epidemiol 1988,
17:643-650.
This influential paper utilized period virus-transmission data to construct
epidemiologic models that suggested monkeypox virus transmission was
unlikely to be sustainable in human society in the absence of repeated
introductions from a zoonotic source.
30. Jezek Z, Grab B, Dixon H: Stochastic model for interhuman
spread of monkeypox. Am J Epidemiol 1987, 126:1082-1092.
31. Arita I, Jezek Z, Khodakevich L, Ruti K: Human monkeypox: a
newly emerged orthopoxvirus zoonosis in the tropical rain
forests of Africa. Am J Trop Med Hyg 1985, 34:781-789.
32. Anderson R, May R: Infectious Diseases of Humans. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 1992.
33. Antia R, Regoes RR, Koella JC, Bergstrom CT: The role of
evolution in the emergence of infectious diseases. Nature
2003, 426:658-661.
34. Huhn GD, Bauer AM, Yorita K, Graham MB, Sejvar J, Likos A,
Damon IK, Reynolds MG, Kuehnert MJ: Clinical characteristics
of human monkeypox, and risk factors for severe disease. Clin
Infect Dis 2005, 41:1742-1751.
35. Jezek Z, Szczeniowski M, Paluku KM, Mutombo M: Human
monkeypox: clinical features of 282 patients. J Infect Dis 1987,
156:293-298.
36. Councilman WT: Some general considerations on the
pathology of smallpox. Public Health Pap Rep 1905, 31:218-229.
37. Wahl-Jensen V, Cann JA, Rubins KH, Huggins JW, Fisher RW,
Johnson AJ, de Kok-Mercado F, Larsen T, Raymond JL,
Hensley LE, Jahrling PB: Progression of pathogenic events in
cynomolgus macaques infected with variola virus. PLoS One
2011, 6:e24832.
38. Dyall J, Johnson RF, Chen DY, Huzella L, Ragland DR, Mollura DJ,
Byrum R, Reba RC, Jennings G, Jahrling PB et al.: Evaluation ofCurrent Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343 Monkeypox disease progression by molecular imaging. J
Infect Dis 2011.
39. Goff AJ, Chapman J, Foster C, Wlazlowski C, Shamblin J, Lin K,
Kreiselmeier N, Mucker E, Paragas J, Lawler J, Hensley L: A novel
respiratory model of infection with monkeypox virus in
cynomolgus macaques. J Virol 2011, 85:4898-4909.
40. Upton C, Slack S, Hunter AL, Ehlers A, Roper RL: Poxvirus
orthologous clusters: toward defining the minimum essential
poxvirus genome. J Virol 2003, 77:7590-7600.
41.

Hendrickson RC, Wang C, Hatcher EL, Lefkowitz EJ:
Orthopoxvirus genome evolution: the role of gene loss. Viruses
2010, 2:1933-1967.
Using a newly developed computational tool, the authors of this article
analyzed a set of 17 fully sequenced Orthopoxvirus genomes and iden-
tified a series of putative gene gain/loss events that have occurred over
the course of Orthopoxvirus evolution and diversification.
42. McLysaght A, Baldi PF, Gaut BS: Extensive gene gain
associated with adaptive evolution of poxviruses. Proc Natl
Acad Sci U S A 2003, 100:15655-15660.
43. Shchelkunov SN, Totmenin AV, Babkin IV, Safronov PF,
Ryazankina OI, Petrov NA, Gutorov VV, Uvarova EA, Mikheev MV,
Sisler JR et al.: Human monkeypox and smallpox viruses:
genomic comparison. FEBS Lett 2001, 509:66-70.
44.

Weaver JR, Isaacs SN: Monkeypox virus and insights into its
immunomodulatory proteins. Immunol Rev 2008, 225:96-113.
This review provides a comprehensive overview of key virus loci that are
known to play a role in modulating the host immune response. The
authors describe the roles of various proteins and the distribution of
genes (presence, absence) across different Orthopoxvirus species (var-
iola, vaccinia, monkeypox viruses).
45. Chen N, Li G, Liszewski MK, Atkinson JP, Jahrling PB, Feng Z,
Schriewer J, Buck C, Wang C, Lefkowitz EJ et al.: Virulence
differences between monkeypox virus isolates from
West Africa and the Congo basin. Virology 2005,
340:46-63.
46.

Likos AM, Sammons SA, Olson VA, Frace AM, Li Y, Olsen-
Rasmussen M, Davidson W, Galloway R, Khristova ML,
Reynolds MG et al.: A tale of two clades: monkeypox viruses. J
Gen Virol 2005, 86:2661-2672.
The authors of this paper describe genome-level differences among
viruses in two different genetic clades of monkeypox and suggest
correlations linking specific gene profile to virulence phenotypes.
47. Liszewski MK, Leung MK, Hauhart R, Buller RM, Bertram P,
Wang X, Rosengard AM, Kotwal GJ, Atkinson JP: Structure and
regulatory profile of the monkeypox inhibitor of complement:
comparison to homologs in vaccinia and variola and evidence
for dimer formation. J Immunol 2006, 176:3725-3734.
48. Liszewski MK, Bertram P, Leung MK, Hauhart R, Zhang L,
Atkinson JP: Smallpox inhibitor of complement enzymes
(SPICE): regulation of complement activation on cells and
mechanism of its cellular attachment. J Immunol 2008,
181:4199-4207.
49. Estep RD, Messaoudi I, O’Connor MA, Li H, Sprague J, Barron A,
Engelmann F, Yen B, Powers MF, Jones JM et al.: Deletion of the
monkeypox virus inhibitor of complement enzymes locus
impacts the adaptive immune response to monkeypox virus in
a nonhuman primate model of infection. J Virol 2011,
85:9527-9542.
50. Girgis NM, Dehaven BC, Xiao Y, Alexander E, Viner KM, Isaacs SN:
The Vaccinia virus complement control protein modulates
adaptive immune responses during infection. J Virol 2011,
85:2547-2556.
51. Rubins KH, Hensley LE, Relman DA, Brown PO: Stunned silence:
gene expression programs in human cells infected with
monkeypox or vaccinia virus. PLoS One 2011, 6:e15615.
52.

Alcami A, Smith GL: A soluble receptor for interleukin-1 beta
encoded by vaccinia virus: a novel mechanism of virus
modulation of the host response to infection. Cell 1992,
71:153-167.
The authors of the paper demonstrate novel functional activity for vacci-
nia virus mediated by the B15R protein. This protein is shown to bind
directly to host IL-1 beta rather than to the IL-1 beta receptor. Variolawww.sciencedirect.com
Factors affecting the likelihood of monkeypox s emergence and spread Reynolds, Carroll and Karem 343viruses (which express a C10L homolog) demonstrate the latter, but not
the former IL-1 beta inhibitory activity.
53. Hutson CL, Olson VA, Carroll DS, Abel JA, Hughes CM, Braden ZH,
Weiss S, Self J, Osorio JE, Hudson PN et al.: A prairie dog animal
model of systemic orthopoxvirus disease using West African
and Congo Basin strains of monkeypox virus. J Gen Virol 2009,
90:323-333.
54. Schultz DA, Sagartz JE, Huso DL, Buller RM: Experimental
infection of an African dormouse (Graphiurus kelleni) with
monkeypox virus. Virology 2009, 383:86-92.www.sciencedirect.com 55. Peterson AT, Papes M, Reynolds MG, Perry N, Hanson B,
Regnery R, Hutson C, Muizniek B, Damon I, Carroll DS: Native-
range ecology and invasive potential of Cricetomys in North
America. J Mammal 2006, 87:427-432.
56. Shchelkunov SN, Totmenin AV, Safronov PF, Gutorov VV,
Ryazankina OI, Petrov NA, Babkin IV, Uvarova EA, Mikheev MV,
Sisler JR et al.: Multiple genetic differences between the
monkeypox and variola viruses. Dokl Biochem Biophys 2002,
384:143-147.Current Opinion in Virology 2012, 2:335–343
